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to illuminate, the riddle of human existence. In their attempts to find meaning for the life of man, they have
been joined by many historians who are convinced that it is also an essential part of their task to discover some
clue to whatever destiny might be in store for the human species. As a result, the past quarter of a century has
seen the appearance of a host of books, pamphlets, and articles devoted to the subject of meaning in history.
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HISTORICAL MEANING

Philosophers and theologians have not been alone during the
present age of crisis in trying to solve, or at least to illumi
nate, the riddle of human existence. In their attempts to find
meaning for the life of man, they have been joined by many his
torians who are convinced that it is also an essential part of
their task to discover some clue to whatever destiny might be
in store for the human species. As a result, the past quarter
of a century has seen the appearance of a host oTTjooks, pamphlei7S, and articles devoted to the subject of meaning in historx*
Reduced to its simplest terms, the task of the hi
an, i n ^
any age is to recount. on the basis of carefully gathered informaxironr-and as
as he can, some aspect of the past. From
history in its most inclusive sense, a series of events which
have occurred, he constructs history in its more usual sense,
which Carl Becker once defined as "the memory of things said and
done." The historian may wish simply to preserve the recollec;y^ of some notable happenings. He may desire to
ng th''
past^o bear upon the present in thp hnnp nf understanding the
present"~or influencing tlie future.. He, may waiLt...to. instill patrio
tism 01*3^
In any event, it is his ultimate
concern wil;h as much of the day-to-day life of man as he can
recapitulate which helps to distinguish the historian from the
social scientist, who is concerned primarily with the social
creature man.
Does the t^g]^ fff the historian end when he has reported what
he_jiali ft VPS tf) jbe the fact^? Jliere are thns"p~linio Tb-i nu
it
does.„iicdL, ttrat if is his further responsibility to garner from
tlie^experience of the past everything possible of value either
for the present or for the future. He discharges this responsi
bility by interpreting that experience to his fellowmen. Other
writers have insisted that when the historian goes beyond the
everyday experience and begins looking for generalizations
or laws in history from which he hopes to derive some pattern,
^ jceases^ being a historian and becomes something else, a philo
sopher pr a theologian. The historian works with facts, these
writers argue, not (as did Hegel) with philosophical principles.
And there are simply too many facts to be mastered to permit much
in the way of accurate generalization.
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Some writers have maintained. foUowing Shakespeare, that
if written history is a tale told Jjy aja- idiQj:, full of sound and
fury, and signifying nothing, that i§Jbgcatise there is jiotiRIog!
i^ the eveitta„lhemse1 ves to impart meaning. Any:„BjaJLi£XnjgLlliph
thiIIhis4^»iajxudis£fiLrjQS, s
argument goes, is-one^^-wliich ^fee,
fiTnifiPi f has Imposed on a series of events which, he has studied.
In effect, this"is to regard the meaning of history as being that
there is no pattern or purpose in human temporal events» This
may not be such a counsel of pessimism or despair as it first
appears. It is possible to look at history as .beliigwLit^t^^
than the record of human crimes and failures, and to find the
real purpose of human existence in an eternal realm entirely
apart from temporal events. In fact, some contemporary theolo
gians and others have found this view a strong antidote to the
once widely held belief which identified the will of God with
such institutions as capitalism and democracy. To see this in
its perspective, we might-ask ourselves whether, had we lived in
the Middle Ages^ we would have (and also whether we should have)
regarded manorialism and feudalism as divinely and permanently
ordained institutions.
Before proceeding further into the knotty question of
historical interpretation, we shall pause to review briefly some
of the answers already put forth by Western man and his forbears.
In spite of the writings of Herodotus and Thucydides, tbP Grppkp
were basically disinterested in developing much oX a,
The world for the£
cosmQS, something
essentially static, In~whicir circular motion wai regarded as
perfect motion. In harmony with this, thtay-believed tliat A^he
pattern of historv^ms cyclicalT Progress and retrogression
fornswed each other in aTsuccession without beginning or end,
without any unfolding pattern superimposed, and in a way which
justified neither cosmic optimism nor pessimism. The great Greek
thinkers turned to iiature-^-tQ^ find meanxng, and^ 1 eft, the,,prjovxnce
of history largely to those interested in the chronicling of
events. The only possibly important use _Q£. hi stnr-y-JQX--±hR Grfifik
fay in its predictivevalue. Since its pattern was cyclical, he
Believed thaC events altogether or nearly repeated themselves.
One who had mastered the course of past events was in a good
position to predict what was about to happen. The Roman emperor,
Marcus Aurelius (161-180), said that by the time one was forty
he had seen everything one will ever see of temporal events«
If to the Greek history bad.-_aQ._imriKxa£L-.Q3:.-4£aal.^„sJjace it was
going nowhere,, much the reyersg_ji,iS™Axil§.-Jor.-th
As far
as the West is concerned, the concept of the historical may be
said to have originated with him. The Hebrew believed that God
had created and—was--pre&erving bo.th .the_itiuvexaa__and^^
order in historic time, and that He had rev®a.led Himself-.to ja
chosen pgople-jtliripugh Abraham anA.,Mosea.. Furthermore, God had
pxofilaiiSCthat if they obeyed Hls^commands-He^-would reward- them
and use themi i n~ful fill ingTiis' purposes. This was an interpret a-
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tion of history in strictly religious terms. It was also very
narrow, since the unfolding of the divine p^an was centered in
one small people,
WhfiTPas
1
into the pMt, lor, tllp
Hebrew it pointed confi
y into the futureV eitiiex--.tp tbg
agpearanc^ of a MssMafe or to soMe^ca^^^^
which would.
establTsK the iebrew people once and for all in* their promised
station; H^°Tf7rY Tunvf"^
^r\ irrrvpr"'-**'^'* stiri^iffht
. Its
^enfs were unique and nonrecurrent; there would never be another
flood or another exodus, nor a new revelation. And it moved
toward a definite goal and conclusion, upon the reaching of
which God would make the meaning of history entirely clear. Thus
the element of time was a significant and serious factor for the
Hebrews, much more so than it has been for toost of the world's
religions. Finally, the Hebrews also believed that history was
mnpT-edi rtah^e. At least part of what happened to man depended on
"his actr^^Fn obeying or rejecting God's commands. Although the
reward for disobedience was indeed.forbidding, thus seeming to
leave man but a Hobson's choice, here was a belief in human free
dom in a sense unknown to the Greeks. It left one less than ever
certain of the full meaning of history, since man always had a
part of his fate in his own hands.
As we have already seent thP rhriRt-itilP''' inherited this Hebrew
it
For them the Incarnation became
tjie central-©venV
instead of the revelation to Abrah^
and Moses. It was Augustine who developed the Christian interpretatTOn of history into a form which remained dominant in the
West, though certainly not unchallenged, for well over a thousand
years. In the City of God he attempted to explain the tension
between human freedom on the one hand and divine purpose on the
other which has characterized Christianity from its beginning.
Augustine beliteved thi§ tension wduld last until the day of judg
ment, when God would sum up history and, in a world beyond it,
solve the riddle of huinsin existence.
The first substantial attack on this Christian undersj^a^
of hisTory came during the EnligHterimenTT^ rt""'was~''1i[alt
who
coiliea" tTx^tem "philosophy of history" to mark the difTerence
between his own view^and"those which' had preceded him. Ypl.tjaiEe
called the written history of the past a pack of tricks played
upon the dead, and regarded it as a record of swperstition and
priestly and n^^
tyranny.. He and other, phiiQSQphes^^who began
rewrITing the rec6rd"w4nted to expose the ifrnorar^c^ and folly of
the past to the cold tight Of reaion.But they were not in retreat
froni history
The great consummsition for which they devoutly
hoped was to occur in the here and now, in historic time; but it
was to be effected by man's efforts, not by God's. As^^Xarl Becker
observed, the heavenly city of the phiXpsopj^es w^
be estab-;,
1 ished x>n earth. ,Human p"erfection, both materially and morally,
was to come through science, reason, and obedience to nature's
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laws. The resulting idea of progress, ably expounded as we
have seen by Condorcet, was in effect a secularized version
of the Hebrew-Christian view of history.
In term^of 1ts popular 1
ficance meiL..Attached
to_il, the stMavnof~~Kmorv rearhAri new
in the ninpfpfiintb
century^ Such tjiinker^ as H®gel. Comte , and Marx sketched,-oiit
.Croa^^^Jtr iki ng7~""and\'coaS^srsStli
which pictured man as mQyth& inexorably toward-Some-great terrestriai c1imks»
Spencer, as we have seen, went so far as to ele
vate progress to the category of a law of history=
Romanticism,
conservatism, and nationalism each in its own way gave an impetus
to the study of the past, as did the rise of democracy and its
concomitant, public education. While the Industrial Revolution
fostered varied attitudes, its upaetti
turned" many^
men to the past for~"some guide in seeking^an adlaistment tfli^them.
DafwTnTs5rr"W suggesting^fiat the changes in nature and man were
both slow and gradual, was ^ powerful force in encouraging.JJbie.
cuULlvation of an hlsto^rical" frame, of
to-^understand
where jnan was, how he
and what likely directigas
lay open to lii^-» Both liberals and conservatives, socialists
and capitalists appealed to history for justification of their
particular theories»
These factors were matched by developments within the field
of history itself. Buring the nineteenth century many sourc*^^ "f
iolormation became readily available to the scholaar for„the J.l:c^t
time. Records~'and indices were published, sometimes with public
fundso
Archeology. anthropology. and phiiningy began presenting
him with the evidences for a greatly improved account of preliterary and early literary timeso
He now not only knew mor§„fljMiut
A^ens. Rome. and Jerusa^lgnj; but also his~v?¥iQn"waE'"W
tp
inciujde earlier advanced cultures hithejctS almost entirelyju^emiam&ered. And his vision began catching more facets of human
society than the political which had long dominated written his
tory. History became a separate branch of study in European and
American colleges and universities»
Its study and teaching became
a recognized and organized profession„ By 1900 a flood of writings
had begun, revising old concepts or perhaps j^^jpteoylng them altoThe day was at hand when the problem would be how to
digest too much evidence rather than how to piece together too
little. The f 1 ood contArjaues^" Never befpre has Western man had
much written history at his beck and call„
As he tends increasingly
€o~asSocrate his destiny^entirely with the historical prpcess, we
can expect the output to grow accordingly.
Those who j)j^pfessed to be writing "scientific history" in
the laTf^ nineteentTS cSnfuf^y' cTa
that they had used all the
spufces which they copld find, painstakingly and criticariy~--"Tn
a word, objectively — to determine_the_factsThen they had rigorousl^.alJLpffljed-the-JEaets^-to^.s^ak„far-4Jieniseiv®s^^ Their tasK,~~tBey
said, was simply to tell the story as it actually happened, for its
own sake, and with as few literary embellishments as possible.
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The great French writer, Fustel de Coulanges (1830-1889), pnce
proclaimed" "It is not I w
which speaks
thTouSh^e." Any' phxlosoph which might be implicit in his
TSc^sTheinsisted, "must be permitted to emerge naturally, of
its own accord." Many "scientific historians," with their faith
in science as the transformer of society, were confident that
the facts which they had gathered and presented only confirmed
the idea of progress.
n';>t \inanimfflifT
iiT^he^Un1ted^tates, for exsmple, i,t„ was.
less popular than in Europe. Henry Ford said thati^istory wsts
"hunk^" Pragmatism, which was primarily an American phenomenon,
w~as much more interested in the present than in the past. Then
t^Oj__±here have always been those who are opposed to histofTcism
as a waste nf time
They have believed that historians become
so obsessed with the past that they make its study an end in
itself. Anyway, they do not think that the problems of the
present can be solved by reference to the past.
As we have seen, many challenges,have been hurled at the
liberal and optimistic \?estei^ worldsview .of the nineteentb
cenjbury, ranging from the New Physics ja,nd Frewd tP two world.,
vTars and severe economic JilslQC^^^
These challenges hav^
forced serious thinkers to review and revise their estimate pf
Western Civilization and of man in general. T^e three selections
which fpllow™r.eprese
only
sampling of the reSinrtsrn&f^^^tte
"Reflections.

1.

Carl Becker on Progress

The first selection was written by jJarl L. Becker (18731945), for many years profe^ser^jQf histpry., at -Cornell».IIn4Yers^^
(1917-1941), and one of^The most highly respected members of his
profession. One of his particular interests was the Enlighten
ment, about which he wrote a famous book; The Heavenly City of,^
the Ej.gLht.eeJith Century Philosophers (1932), But while he clung
To~hTsITilErnatipn with'~tIS~EnITgEtenmejit, Becker was in revolt^
against the "scientific history" w^iich it Jiad^largely fostered.
•fhe^^ideal of scientific histpcy , he thpught, was ijo^le enough,
but^nattainable and.^^W^
Influenced by pragmatism, BeckeJl^
askedTth^^
Can there be anything like objectively
wrl.t3teja-jb,ist.ory? Is the^raw" m^^^^
from which it is to be
derived a string of "pure" facts that the historian can isolate
and serve up? Or is"not the historian himself so deeply involved
in his own cultural milieu that he reads into the past his own
presuppositions (whether he wants to or not) and to a consider
able extent finds what he wants there, both facts and inter
pretations?

